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Stretching the Fourteenth Amendment
and Substantive Due Process:
Another "Close Call" for 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Terrell v. Larson'
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years ago, Justice John Harlan noted that the United States Consti-
tution "is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor [is the]
Court... a general haven for reform movements. 2 Written during an era of
judicial progressivism, Justice Harlan's words capture perfectly the essence
of the Eighth Circuit's majority opinion in Terrell v. Larson, a recent substan-
tive due process case from Minnesota.
Substantive due process claims often tug at the heartstrings of our juris-
prudence, and Terrell is certainly no exception. This Note will explore the
legal foundations and policy implications of Terrell and attempt to illustrate
that, while the Eighth Circuit correctly dismissed Terrell's claims, the court
failed to capitalize on an opportunity to encourage state legislatures to pro-
vide causes of action for these substantive due process cases.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 29, 2000, at 10:05:07 p.m., Deputy Sheriffs Brek Larson
and Shawn Longen received a transmission from the Anoka County Sheriff
Department (the "Department") regarding a domestic disturbance call.3 Upon
learning that the Department had assigned the call a "very high priority,"4
Larson radioed back at 10:05:39 p.m. and stated that he and Longen would
respond . At 10:06:06 p.m. and at 10:06:43 p.m., two other officers radioed
that they were already responding to the call and that Larson and Longen
could cancel.6 The two officers continued, however, at least in part because
Larson thought that responding would provide Longen with "some good ex-
perience handling" these emergency situations.
7
1. 396 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2005).
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. Appellants' Brief& Addendum at 5, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975 (No. 03-1293).
4. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 977.
5. Appellants' Brief& Addendum, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975, at 5.
6. Id. at 5-6.
7. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 980. An internal affairs report produced by the Depart-
ment concluded that Larson "believed this to be a high-priority, threatening-type call
and because of that continued driving emergency." Id. Terrell did not challenge Lar-
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Approximately two minutes later, Larson and Longen set out in their pa-
trol vehicle, with Larson at the wheel.8 Due to a recent snowfall, the roads
were covered with ice and slush.9 At a speed of approximately 95 miles per
hour,'0 Larson approached the intersection of Minnesota Highway 65 and
Crosstown Boulevard and noticed yellow lights flashing ahead, indicating the
light at the intersection was about to turn red." Larson slowed to between 30
and 45 miles per hour and then accelerated, believing that there were no other
cars near the intersection.' 2 After the light had turned red, 13 Larson entered
the intersection at approximately 64 miles per hour and broadsided the vehicle
of Talena Terrell, who died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.14
Terrell's heirs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,15 alleging a
violation of Terrell's substantive due process right to life. 16 Larson and Lon-
gen filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. ' 7 The
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied the summary
judgment motion, and the two officers appealed.'8 A divided Eighth Circuit
son's assertion that he did, in fact, believe he was responding to an emergency. See id.
In fact, the issue was not discussed until the en banc argument. Id. For further discus-
sion, see infra note 145.
8. Brief of Appellees at 4, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975 (No. 03-1293). The vehicle
was a new Ford F-250 truck that Larson had never driven before his shift that day. Id.
at 13-14.
9. Brief of Appellees, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975, at 5.
10. Appellants' Brief & Addendum, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975, at 7.
11. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 977.
12. Appellants' Brief& Addendum, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975, at 7.
13. The Minnesota State Highway Patrol determined that the light had turned red
at least four or five seconds before Larson's vehicle entered the intersection. Brief of
Appellees, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975, at 5. Because of this, and also because of the road's
conditions, an Internal Affairs report concluded that "Larson violated state law regu-
lating officers engaged in emergency driving, violated department regulations, and
drove in a manner totally inconsistent with his training." Terrell, 396 F.3d at 985
(Lay, J., dissenting).
14. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 977 (majority opinion).
15. Section 1983 states, in part, that any "person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, . . . causes . . .any citizen of the United
States .. .to [be deprived] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
16. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 975. The original action named Larson, Longen, former
Sheriff Larry Podany, and Anoka County as Defendants. Appellants' Brief & Adden-
dum, Terrell, 396 F.3d 975, at 3. The district court granted summary judgment for
Larry Podany and Anoka County. Id.
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panel affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for Larson, reversed the denial
of qualified immunity for Longen, and remanded for further proceedings. '
9
After vacating the panel's decision, the Eighth Circuit granted en banc
review, and on February 4, 2005, the court reversed the district court's denial
of summary judgment as to both of the defendants. 20 In dismissing Terrell's
claims, the Eighth Circuit held that Larson and Longen were entitled to quali-
fied immunity under either an intent-to-harm standard or a standard of delib-
erate indifference because their conduct was neither intentional nor con-
science-shocking. 21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Terrell involves a number of broad legal issues, including claims
brought under section 1983, assertions of qualified immunity, and the varying
standards used to determine whether state actors have violated a person's
constitutional rights. This section will separately analyze each of these issues
in an effort to contextualize the discussion that occurs in Terrell.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Enacted in 1871 to preserve "human liberty and human rights," "§
1983 creates an action for damages and injunctive relief for the benefit" of
individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated.23 At its base, the
statute reflects the congressional judgment that "[a] damages remedy against
the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cher-
ished constitutional guarantees."2 During the last twenty-five years, the stat-
ute "has become the primary vehicle for litigation requiring state officials to
obey the commands of federal constitutional or statutory law."25 However, as
19. Terrell v. Larson, 371 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated & rev'd, Terrell, 396
F.3d 975.
20. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 977.
21. Id. at 978-81.
22. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980) (citation
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
23. SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 1.01
(2nd ed. 1986).
24. Owen, 445 U.S. at 651.
25. WILLIAM COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1182-83 (12th ed. 2005). In 1961, after lying dormant for ninety years, section
1983 finally arrived on the civil rights scene, with the Supreme Court's holding in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Monroe case arose in Chicago, after po-
lice officers broke into and ransacked Monroe's house, arrested Monroe, and prohib-
ited him from communicating with an attorney. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167. Monroe
sued the officers and the City of Chicago in federal court under section 1983, claim-
ing a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
2006]
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courts often remind us, section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but merely ... a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.,
26
In an article discussing section 1983's evolution, legal scholar Richard
Carlisle noted that section 1983 litigation "developed against a 'background
of tort liability' - largely in cases against public officials sued in their indi-
vidual capacities for malfeasant conduct and abuse of authority." 27 According
to Carlisle and other scholars, "a kind of constitutional tort" was developing,
which was neither a private tort nor constitutional law, despite possessing
elements of both.28 This "interesting amalgam" gave rise to serious questions
about the extent of the substantive rights being protected by section 1983,
questions that continue to plague courts today.
29
In attempting to answer these questions, Marshall Shapo maintains that
the "ideal judicial solution must be one with enough substance to supply a
standard of flexibility to cover a broad range of interests." 30 In practice, how-
ever, this standard has not been so flexible. Rather, the Supreme Court has
"thrown 'interpretation of the contours of... liability under § 1983' into 'a
state of evolving definition and uncertainty." ' 31 And, as evidenced by the case
law, it seems that the selection of the appropriate level of culpability is de-
terminative in deciding the defendant's liability in each case. 32
Ultimately, to be successful, section 1983 claimants must assert and
prove two separate elements. 33 The first inquiry is "whether the conduct com-
plained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law." 34 If
the first question is answered affirmatively, courts then ask "whether th[e]
the Court held that Monroe's "federal remedy [was] supplementary to the state rem-
edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one [was]
invoked." Id. at 169. Additionally, the Court held that the police officers' actions fell
under color of state law, even though the officers were acting in violation of state law.
Id. at 187. Today, Monroe is recognized as a landmark case in civil rights actions,
and many current cases can be traced back to Monroe.
26. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)) (quotation marks omitted).
27. Richard G. Carlisle, Section 1983: The Preeminent Issue - A Species of Tort
or Statutory Liability, in SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 3, 3 (Robert H. Freilich
& Richard G. Carlisle eds., 1983) (quoting Morgan v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
(1961)).
28. Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 323-24 (1965) (quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 324.
30. Id. at 325.
31. Carlisle, supra note 27, at 6 (citation omitted).
32. See infra Parts III.C and III.B for a discussion of these levels of culpability
and corresponding case law.
33. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) overruled on other grounds by
Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999,
1002 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535).
34. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
[Vol. 71
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conduct deprived a person of rights, privile es, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." 35 If these two elements are estab-
lished, a court will then look at any defenses asserted by the defendant, the
most common of which is the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
B. The Affirmative Defense of Qualified Immunity
A significant obstacle in the path of many section 1983 claims, qualified
immunity provides state actors with "an entitlement not to stand trial or face
,,36the other burdens of litigation. Because the defense is "an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability[,J" and because it is lost when "a
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial[,]" qualified immunity rulings
must occur early "so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the
defense is dispositive."
3 7
In determining whether a state actor is entitled to qualified immunity,
courts use a sequential, two-step analysis. 38 Viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the allegedly injured party, the first question is whether a state
actor's conduct violated a constitutional right.39 In an action alleging a viola-
tion of substantive due process rights, courts require plaintiffs to show that
the state actor's behavior was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly
be said to shock the contemporary conscience. '4 ° In making these determina-
tions, courts have recognized that official conduct can cause injury in a vari-
ety of wals, and that "conscience shocking" behavior may take on a number
of forms. As a result, with an eye toward tort law's continuum of liability,
courts "must first determine the level of culpability the § 1983 plaintiff must
prove to establish that [a] defendant's conduct [was] conscience shocking. 42
In applying these standards, jurisdictions have reached varying results.43
If a court finds that a state actor's conduct violated a plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights, the next step is to determine whether the right in question was
clearly established at the time of the violation." The "relevant, dispositive
inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it
35. Id.
36. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
37. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 201. In contrast to the second requirement, courts have struggled to
articulate consistent answers to this first question, and as a result, have delineated a
number of standards to help guide them in their considerations. For an in-depth dis-
cussion of these standards, see infra Part III.C.
40. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting County of Sac-
ramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part III.D.
44. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
2006]
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would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation." 45 Application of this standard, however, does not mean that the
"very action in question' 46 must have been addressed by a previous court.
Rather, it means that "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must
be apparent.
47
In cases like Terrell, where the underlying action is based on the plain-
tiff's constitutional right to life, this second element is rarely an issue. The
controversy usually centers on the determination of whether a state actor's
conduct violated a constitutionally protected right. As noted previously, this
determination is driven by the court's selection of the appropriate level of
culpability.4
8
C. Levels of Culpability
In assessing whether a state actor has violated a constitutionally pro-
tected right, courts have traditionally used three levels of culpability: negli-
gence, intent, and deliberate indifference. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
the leading Supreme Court case on these varying standards, the Court sum-
marized its reluctance to expand substantive due process beyond intentionally
caused harm, stating that the "constitutional concept of conscience shocking
... points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at the ends of
the tort law's spectrum of culpability.
'A9
In keeping with this tradition of confining substantive due process,
courts have consistently held that "liability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process." 50 In ration-
alizing these rulings, most courts have followed the Supreme Court's asser-
tion that the "Fourteenth Amendment is not a 'font of tort law to be superim-
posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.''
45. Id. at 202; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (adding that
"[flor a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours 'must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right"' (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
46. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.
47. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
49. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 (holding that in a police chase aimed at apprehending
a suspected offender, intent-to-harm is the only level of culpability that will shock the
conscience).
50. Id. at 848-49; see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (ex-
tending Daniels to substantive, as well as procedural, due process); Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (reaffirming the idea that the Constitution "does not
purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate
liability for injuries that attend living together in society").
51. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
Lewis also stated that the "'[United States] Constitution deals with the large concerns
[Vol. 71
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In contrast, while "[m]ere negligence is never sufficient"52 for substan-
tive due process purposes, behavior that is "intended to injure ... is the sort
of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level. 53 This
.intent-to-harm standard is most clearly applied in "rapidly evolving, fluid,
and dangerous situations which preclude the luxury of calm and reflective
deliberation."
54
In Terrell, with negligence out as a potential basis of liability, and with-
out any evidence of intent on the part of either Larson or Longen to violate
Terrell's constitutional rights, the only alternative for the plaintiffs was to
frame their argument in terms of "deliberate indifference." 5 The following
two sections will focus on this nebulous standard.
D. Deliberate Indifference
1. County of Sacramento v. Lewis
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, a motorcycle passenger was killed
during a high-speed police chase, and his parents brought a section 1983
claim against the driver of the police vehicle, alleging a deprivation of sub-
stantive due process rights.56 After ruling out negligence and intent-to-harm
as possible bases of liability, the Court began its analysis of deliberate indif-
ference by acknowledging that "[w]hether the point of the conscience shock-
ing is reached when injuries are produced with culpability ... following from
something more than negligence" but less than intent is a close call.57 Despite
some misgivings, the Lewis Court "expressly recognized the possibility that
some official acts in this range may be actionable under the Fourteenth
Amendment."
58
The Court in Lewis realized that "[d]eliberate indifference that shocks in
one environment may not be so patently egregious in another, and ... [that]
of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort
law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living
together in society."' Id. (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332).
52. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2005).
53. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (asserting that the
"guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government
officials to deprive a person a person of life, liberty, or property").
54. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 978 (quoting Neal v. St. Louis County Bd. of Police
Comm'rs, 217 F.3d 955, 958 (8th Cir. 2000)) (quotation marks omitted).
55. See Terrell, 396 F.3d at 977.
56. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836-37.
57. Id. at 849 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986)).
58. Id. (mentioning that in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,
463 U.S. 239 (1983), the court equated the due process rights of a pretrial detainee
with those of a convicted prisoner, and held that deliberately indifferent conduct in
either case could constitute a violation of substantive due process rights).
20061
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preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands
an exact analysis of [the] circumstances." 59 Guided by this circumstantial
approach, the Lewis Court stated that, in contrast to the intent-to-harm stan-
dard, a deliberate indifference standard "is sensibly employed only when
actual deliberation is practical." 6 Since the Lewis Court found that the police
officer's decision was made "under pressure, and ... without the luxury of a
second chance[,]" the Court applied the intent-to-harm standard.61
2. Coleman v. Parkman
In addition to the Lewis Court's deliberate indifference standard, the
Eighth Circuit devised a two-part test in Coleman v. Parkman 62 to assess
conduct falling in the realm of deliberate indifference. Under this two-part
analysis, an injured party must demonstrate that (1) the state official knew of
a substantial risk of harm, and (2) the state official failed to reasonably re-
63
spond to that risk. Regarding the first element, it is not enough to show that
a reasonable person would have known, or even that the state official should
have known, of a substantial risk.64 An injured party may, however, demon-
strate knowledge of a risk through the use of "circumstantial evidence," and
courts may infer that an official knew of a substantial risk simply because the
risk was obvious.
65
In applying the Lewis and Coleman standards, different jurisdictions
have emphasized different components of each test, resulting in a disordered
and unpredictable body of case law.
3. Deliberate Indifference Case Law
A review of decisions from courts focusing on section 1983 liability in
situations involving police officer misconduct" demonstrates that the "critical
consideration [for determining liability under section 1983 is] whether the
59. Id. at 850.
60. Id. at 851. Like many legal terms, the phrase "actual deliberation" has been
manipulated and molded into a variety of meanings. The court in Lewis mentioned,
however, that the phrase "'actual deliberation' [does] not mean 'deliberation' in the
narrow," criminal law sense of the term. Id. at 851 n. 11.
61. Id. at 853 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
62. 349 F.3d 534 (8th Cir. 2003).
63. Id. at 538.
64. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994).
65. Id.
66. Like section 1983 claims in general, police officer misconduct claims en-
compass a variety of circumstances. In many cases, including Terrell, courts faced
with a scarcity of case law in one specific area will compare a number of these cir-
cumstances in hopes of deriving consistent results.
[Vol. 71
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circumstances are such that 'actual deliberation is practical.' '67 For instance,
in Radecki v. Barela, the Tenth Circuit held that there was no violation of a
constitutional right when a bystander was killed by a suspect after a sheriff
instructed the bystander to assist him in subduing the suspect.68 In keeping
with Lewis, the Radecki court asserted that when actual deliberation is practi-
cal, "public officials must make policy decisions with careful attention to
their special relationship to those in custody - and about which they have the
luxury of prolonged consideration." 69 Under the facts of Radecki, however,
the court found that such deliberation was not practical.7 °
More recently, in Claybrook v. Birchwell, plaintiffs filed suit against
several police officers after the officers, while attempting to apprehend a sus-
pect, killed one plaintiff's father-in-law and injured the other plaintiffs.7 I
After outlining Lewis's deliberate indifference standard, the Sixth Circuit
suggested that a "more exacting 'malicious or sadistic' standard of proof'
might exist in situations where officers have little or no time to deliberate.7 2
Ultimately, the court concluded that because the officers were not aware of
the plantiffs' presence, the officers did not deprive the plaintiffs of their con-
stitutional rights.7 3
Although also focusing on the time available for deliberation, the Sixth
Circuit in Ewolski v. City of Brunswick74 reached the opposite result. In
Ewolski, the plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the police officers violated
their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during a standoff that ended in
a murder-suicide.7 5 The Sixth Circuit ultimately held that the defendants had
not, in fact, violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.76 In doing so, how-
ever, the court subjected the defendants' actions to the deliberate indifference
67. Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998)).
68. Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998).
69. Id. at 1231.
70. Id. at 1232.
71. Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2000).
72. Id. at 360 (quoting County v. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854
(1998)).
73. See id.; see also Carter v. Simpson, 328 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
that there was no violation of a constitutional right when a police officer who was
responding to a reported death collided with the plaintiff's car); Apodoca v. Rio Ar-
riba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that there
was no constitutional violation when a woman was killed by a police vehicle respond-
ing to a silent burglar alarm); Walton v. Salter, 547 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976) (assert-
ing no violation of constitutional rights when officers struck pedestrian while re-
sponding to an armed robbery call because it constituted only an isolated act of negli-
gence).
74. 287 F.3d 492, 496 (6th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 496.
76. See id. at 515-16.
2006]
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standard, because the officers' actions had taken place over the course of a
two-day period.
7 7
The Eighth Circuit has faced similar issues in recent years. In Helseth v.
Burch, a motorist was severely injured after being struck by a suspect who
was being pursued by a police officer. 78 The court held that because the offi-
cer did not intend to harm the plaintiff, there had been no deprivation of the
plaintiff's rights.79 In so holding, the Helseth court overruled the decision in
Feist v. Simonsen, which held that a deliberate indifference standard should
be applied in cases where there is "ample time to deliberate." 80 The Helseth
court took issue with the Feist panel's unwillingness to pay heed to the Lewis
decision, which expressly dealt with high-speed automobile pursuit cases.
8 1
Additionally, the court criticized the Feist panel for failing to recognize that
Lewis was founded on the Supreme Court's unwillingness to increase the
scope of substantive due process.8
2
The Eighth Circuit, however, has held that the deliberate indifference
standard is applicable in some instances, most notably when an officer's ac-
tions were reckless.8 3 For example, in Wilson v. Lawrence County, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity because the
evidence presented could prove that the officer in question acted recklessly or
intentionally. 4 Additionally, in Entergy, Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, the court
stated that where "officials had an opportunity to consider various altema-
tives[,]" deliberately indifferent conduct on the part of the official may be
conscience-shocking. 85 With this case law as its backdrop, the Eighth Circuit
in Terrell attempted to pull these theoretical strands together in the hopes of
discerning a consistent and just result.
77. Id. at 510-16.
78. Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 2001), overruling Feist v. Si-
monsen, 222 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2000).
79. See id. at 872.
80. Feist, 222 F.3d at 464.
81. Helseth, 258 F.3d at 871 ("Lewis plainly stated that the intent-to-harm stan-
dard, rather than the deliberate indifference standard, applies to all high-speed police
pursuits aimed at apprehending suspected offenders"); see also Slusharchuk v. Hoff,
346 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding no constitutional violation when a
motorist's vehicle was struck in an intersection by a suspect who was fleeing police
officers).
82. See Helseth, 258 F.3d at 870.
83. See Neal v. St. Louis County Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 217 F.3d 955, 958 (8th
Cir. 2000) (stating that "[i]n situations where a state actor is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to deliberate various alternatives prior to electing a course of action, the
chosen action will be deemed 'conscience shocking' if the action was taken with
'deliberate indifference' (citation omitted)).
84. Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 957 (8th Cir. 2001).
85. Entergy, Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 991 (8th Cir. 2001).
(Vol. 71
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A. The Majority Opinion
The Eighth Circuit granted en banc review of Terrell after vacating a
panel decision to reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity.
8 6
Chief Judge Loken authored the majority opinion of the court, in which nine
other justices joined.8 7
The majority began by citing the Supreme Court's assertion in Lewis
that when police officers are involved "in a high-speed automobile chase
aimed at apprehending a suspected offender... only a purpose to cause harm
unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary
conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a [substantive] due process
violation. ''s The court then mentioned its post-Lewis holding in Helseth,
noting that this intent-to-harm standard "applies to all § 1983 substantive due
process claims based upon the conduct of public officials engaged in a high-
speed automobile chase," regardless of whether the pursuing officers had
time to deliberate.8 9
After discussing the facts and procedural posture of the case,90 the court
applied a two-step test to determine whether Larson and Longen were entitled
to qualified immunity.9' Drawing from Lewis, the court noted that the first
inquiry is whether a "plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional
right," and the second is "whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly
established at the time of the events in question." 92 After establishing that for
a substantive due process violation to occur, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the behavior in question "shock[ed] the contemporary conscience, 93 the
court asserted that while negligence will never qualify as conscience-
shocking, proof of intent-to-harm will usually suffice.94 According to the
court, an "intermediate level of culpability" known as deliberate indifference
86. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2005); see supra notes 15-21 and
accompanying text.
87. Id. at 976.
88. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998))
(quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
89. Id. at 977 (quoting Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), overruling Feist v. Simonson, 222 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2000)) (quotation marks
omitted).
90. See supra Part II.
91. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 978.
92. Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5) (quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8) (quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49).
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will sometimes satisfy the conscience-shocking standard,95 but only when
"actual deliberation is practical. 96
The court rejected the panel majority's decision to limit Lewis's holding
to cases involving high-speed pursuit cases and likened the decision facing
Larson and Longen in this case to that of police during a riot.9 7 The majority
reasoned that like prison officials during a riot, police officers responding to
highly unpredictable domestic disturbances are precluded "the luxury ... of
having time to make unhurried judgments."98 According to the majority, the
panel's decision to hold these officers liable under a deliberate indifference
standard would deter effective police response in these situations, thereby
increasing the risk of harm.99
Then, the court discussed decisions of other circuits in these situations,
and decided that "every circuit to consider the issue has applied the Lewis
intent-to-harm standard to... situations involving law enforcement and gov-
ernment workers deployed in emergency situations."' t° Fearful of deterring
police response, and mindful of these other courts' decisions, the majority
held that the "intent-to-harm standard of Lewis applies to an officer's decision
to engage in high-speed driving in response to other types of emergencies,
and to the manner in which the police car is then driven in proceeding to the
scene of the emergency.
''101
Substantive due process liability, according to the court, hinges on this
intent-to-harm standard, and as a result, courts making these inquiries should
look to a state official's subjective "evil intent."' 0 2 Upon making this deter-
mination, the court stated that in the case of Larson and Longen, liability
would depend on whether they "subjectively believed that they were respond-
ing to an emergency." 
103
The court then discussed the plaintiffs' argument that the question of
whether Larson and Longen subjectively believed they were responding to an
emergency was a material issue of fact and that, as a result, the determination
should be made by a jury.'1 4 The majority, however, declared this argument
"irrelevant," explaining that the inquiry was not whether Larson and Longen
were reasonable in believing they were responding to an emergency, but
whether the deputies subjectively believed they were responding to an emer-
95. Id. (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49).
96. Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S at 851) (quotation marks omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 979 (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853) (quotation
marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 1998)) (quo-
tation marks omitted).
101. Id.
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gency105 After reaffirming this subjective standard and mentioning that it
was "undisputed that Larson and Longen believed they were responding to an
emergency," the court held that "the intent-to-harm standard applie[d] as a
matter of law."' 06
The court also concluded that even under the "deliberate indifference
standard of fault adopted by the panel majority," Larson and Longen were not
liable.'07 The court based this alternative holding on the fact that the "con-
science shocking standard is intended to limit substantive due process liabil-
ity,' 1 8 and because "the Fourteenth Amendment is not a font of tort law" that
can be applied to a state's pre-existing legal systems.'19
In closing, the court reversed the district court's order, and remanded the
case with directions to dismiss the claim against Larson and Longen. 11°
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Authored by Circuit Judge Lay, and joined by Judge Heaney"' and
Judge Bye, the dissent began by claiming that the majority's decision to ex-
tend Lewis's high-speed pursuit rule to shield Larson and Longen from liabil-
ity would, in effect, grant other officers in these situations "unqualified im-
munity.,112 For fear of creating such a standard, and because of their belief
that section 1983 exists to provide citizens with a remedy for these usurpa-
tions of executive power, the three judges dissented." 3
After establishing that the court's task was to determine whether Larson
and Longen were entitled to qualified immunity, the dissent restated the se-
105. Id.
106. Id. The majority remarked that the police department's internal report sug-
gested that at least part of Larson's motivation in responding to this call was to pro-
vide Longen with experience in handling these types of calls. Id. The court, however,
refused to take this evidence into account; as the plaintiffs failed to raise the issue in
the district court. Id.
107. Id. at 980.
108. Id. at 981.
109. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998))
(quotation marks omitted).
110. Id.
11. In a separate dissent, Judge Heaney investigated the suggestion that if Terrell
had been killed in Nebraska, her estate could have recovered under Nebraska's tort
law. Id. at 986 (Heamey, J., dissenting). He concluded that because the statute only
applied in cases where officers were attempting to "apprehend one or more occupants
of another motor vehicle," the statute would not provide Terrell's family with the type
of recovery to which they were entitled. Id. at 986-87. Thus, Judge Heaney joined in
Judge Lay's dissent, but also wrote separately to call attention to the inability of fami-
lies to recover in these situations. Id. at 987.
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quential, two-part test, as proscribed in Coleman."14 The dissent analyzed the
three standards of culpability, and stated that when "actual deliberation ... is
practical, conduct that is deliberately indifferent may shock the con-
science." 1 5 Based on this language, the dissent argued that the Lewis intent-
to-harm standard, as expounded by the Eighth Circuit in Helseth,116 should be
limited to high-speed pursuit cases.
1 17
After asserting that the majority's reliance on Lewis was misplaced, the
dissent pointed out several differences between a high-speed pursuit and the
response in Terrell.' 8 First, the dissent noted that officers in pursuit cases
find themselves thrust into these situations, while Larson consciously and
voluntarily decided to respond to this call, despite being informed that other
officers were already responding." 9 Second, according to Judge Lay, suspect
pursuits require instantaneous reactions, whereas Larson and Longen were
afforded ample opportunity to deliberate.' 20 The dissent argued that Larson
and Longen had plenty of time to "deliberate various alternatives" before
deciding to depart, and that Larson "actually did deliberate" in deciding to
respond to provide Longen with experience.' Finally, the dissent stated that,
whereas officers in pursuit cases often must break traffic laws to avoid losing
a fleeing suspect, Larson and Longen were in no danger of losing anyone.
22
Because of these distinctions, the dissent concluded that deliberate indiffer-
ence was the appropriate standard to assess Larson's and Longen's liability in
this case.'
23
This deliberate indifference standard, according to the dissent, requires
the "defendant know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.' 24
In applying this standard to Longen, the dissent concurred with the majority
and agreed that the claims against Longen should be dismissed. 25 Pointing
out that "[c]ontext is of vital importance in due process analysis[,]" the dis-
114. Id. at 984. For a discussion of this test, see supra notes 63-65 and accompany-
ing text.
115. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 982 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 851 (1998)) (emphasis omitted).
116. Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (extending Lewis' intent-to-
harm standard to all section 1983 claims based upon the conduct of public officials
engaged in high-speed chases, regardless of whether conditions allowed time to delib-
erate).
117. See Terrell, 396 F.3d at 982.
118. Id. at 984.
119. Id.
120. Id.
12 I. Id. at 983 (emphasis omitted).
122. Id. at 984.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534, 538 (8th Cir. 2003) (deline-
ating the Eighth Circuit's test, which is similar to the one proposed by the dissent).
125. See Terrell, 396 F.3d at 984 (Lay, J., dissenting).
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sent turned its attention to Larson.' 26 In looking at the context of the accident
in Terrell, the dissent emphasized Larson's unfamiliarity with the police ve-
hicle, his speed at the time of the accident, and the fact that this accident oc-
curred on a wet and slushy December night.127 Because of these factors, and
because Larson would have known of the dangers of violating traffic laws,
the dissent concluded that Larson "was deliberately indifferent to a substan-
tial risk of harm."''
28
After establishing a violation of Terrell's constitutionally protected
rights, the dissent analyzed whether this right was clearly established at the
time of the violation. 29 According to the dissent, a right is clearly established
when the "contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear [so] that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."' 30 Judge
Lay had "no doubt that Ms. Terrell had a substantive due process right to be
free from the state's arbitrary deprivation of her life."'' The dissent argued
that the Lewis decision would have put the defendants on notice that "in situa-
tions other than suspect pursuits [when] actual deliberation is practical[,]" the
deliberate indifference standard would apply.'3 2 Thus, the dissent determined
that at the time of the accident, Terrell's fights were clearly established.'
Ultimately, after performing the two-step qualified immunity analysis,
the dissent concluded that while Longen was entitled to qualified immunity,
Larson was not. 13
4
V. COMMENT
Undoubtedly, the Terrell decision is one of the "close[] calls" mentioned
in Lewis, teetering on the edge of liability.' 35 Terrell involved an intricate
balancing of policy concerns. On one side, the court looked at the egregious-
ness of the officers' actions in killing Talena Terrell. On the other, the court
considered the effects of holding these officers to a deliberate indifference
standard, and the Supreme Court's reluctance to stretch or distort the Four-
teenth Amendment's Substantive Due Process Clause.
This section will investigate the Eighth Circuit's attempt at balancing
these competing concerns by first discussing the alternative prongs on which
the Terrell decision hangs. After determining that the Terrell court simply
126. Id. at 985.
127. Id. at 984-85.
128. Id. at 985.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (quotation
marks omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 985-86.
133. Id. at 986.
134. Id.
135. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
2006]
15
Thoenen: Thoenen: Stretching the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
failed to fully explain its decision to dismiss the claims against these officers,
the section will explore the constitutional foundations and broad policy con-
siderations of the decision in Terrell, and attempt to fully explain why section
1983 claims require such a high level of state actor culpability. Finally, this
section will conclude that while the Eighth Circuit's decision in Terrell is
correct in regard to its constitutional and legal principles, the court should
have encouraged state legislatures to adopt policies that will provide for vic-
tims in these situations.
In Terrell, the majority's alternative holdings are both sufficient, on
their own, to prove that Larson and Longen are entitled to qualified imnmu-
nity. Under the first holding, which applied the intent-to-harm standard, the
court determined that because there was no evidence that Larson or Longen
intended to harm Terrell, they could not have violated her rights in this man-
ner.136 The second holding applied the deliberate indifference standard, as
delineated by Lewis and its predecessors, and the court asserted that even
under this lesser standard, the defendants' behavior was not conscience-
shocking and, thus, did not violate Terrell's constitutional rights.
137
In contrast to the rich discussion leading to the first holding, the second
holding, which involved the standard of deliberate indifference, is hammered
out in a conclusory and unsatisfying manner, providing little, if any, guidance
to future courts or plaintiffs. In fact, the majority refuses to acknowledge that
Larson had time to deliberate his response in this instance. At least twice, he
was told to cancel his response, but did not.1 38 Instead, believing that this
was, indeed, an emergency, and that responding would provide Longen with
experience in handling these volatile situations, Larson consciously decided
to respond.1
39
Under Lewis, the deliberate indifference standard applies when there is
actual time for deliberation.14 In contrast, the intent-to-harm standard applies
in "rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous situations which preclude the lux-
ury of calm and reflective deliberation."' 14 1 In Terrell, there was time for de-
liberation, but that time was short and continually evolving, in that changes
136. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 980 (majority opinion). The Terrell case may have come
out completely differently, at least on the intent-to-harm side of the holding, if the plain-
tiffs had raised the issue of whether Larson and Longen actually thought they were
responding to an emergency. The court implied that if Larson's intent was not to actu-
ally respond to the emergency, but instead to provide Longen with much-needed experi-
ence at handling these emergency calls, the result may have been different. See id.
137. See id. at 980-81.
138. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
139. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 980 (stating that "Larson said one reason he decided not
to cancel was that responding would give Deputy Longen, 'a rookie, some good ex-
perience handling [these emergency] type[s] of call[s]"').
140. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851.
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were rapidly occurring in the status of the Department's collective re-
sponse.' 2 Thus, the question remains whether deliberate indifference or in-
tent-to-harm should have been used.
Interestingly, though, the Eighth Circuit's decision to protect the officers
in Terrell fails to secure this same protection in the future, as the majority
fails to explain why several minutes of time is not enough to constitute "ac-
tual time for deliberation."'' 43 Presumably, if the majority had entered into this
sort of analysis, the result would have been the same - Larson and Longen
would have been protected from liability. In addition, however, future offi-
cers in Larson's and Longen's shoes would have guidance as to what con-
stitutes adequate time for deliberation, and moreover, what is meant by
"deliberation."
In reaching its alternative conclusions, the Eighth Circuit mentioned the
Supreme Court's trend of limiting the scope of substantive due process. Un-
fortunately, neither Lewis nor Terrell explain why this trend has developed
the way it has. At first glance, it is difficult to feel comfortable with the deci-
sion in Terrell, as the innocent plaintiffs are forced to leave empty-handed,
while the defendants, who acted irresponsibly and contrary to their own inter-
nal policies, successfully avoided liability. In looking at the constitutional
underpinnings of Terrell's dispositive policies, however, the decision begins
to seem more palatable, and even correct.
In a prudential and cautious fashion, the Supreme Court has been reluc-
tant to stretch or distort the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process
clause to cover section 1983 claims like Terrell. According to civil rights
scholar Sheldon Nahmod,
there is considerable tension between the underlying purposes of §
1983, which... reflect a distrust of state entities and state courts..
• , and the current view of some of the Justices of the Supreme
Court (and increasing numbers of federal judges) that many [of
these] claims do not belong in federal courts but should instead be
brought in state courts in the first instance, if at all.' 44
Elaborating on Nahmod's assertion, Richard Carlisle states that "[s]tretching
the use of the tort remedy to every case in which a constitutional right has
been abridged, without regard to traditional tort concepts, goes too far."'' 45
142. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
143. See Terrell, 396 F.3d 975.
144. NAHMOD, supra note 23, at § 1.04.
145. Carlisle, supra note 27, at 6. The author goes on to state that "[it is difficult
to grasp, however, what is specifically wrong with [stretching the section 1983 claim,
and thereby the Fourteenth Amendment] because it possesses a certain superficial
appeal that almost defies criticism." Id.; see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (1992). Collins stated that the Supreme Court "has always been
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
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Nahmod's assertion underscores the broader point that the United States
Constitution's chief purpose, in addition to securing the rights of its citizens,
is to provide the structure of our government. It is far beyond the scope of this
Note, however, to delve into the successes and failures of federalism, but it is
apparent that under our current federalist system, ample respect is given to
state governments and state court systems to achieve adequate results in a
variety of legal areas. 
146
In light of this, in situations such as that presented in Terrell, it seems
preferable for state legislatures to address these more local concerns, as each
state could then tailor its laws accordingly. In this case, for example, Minne-
sota could provide a state tort action for citizens who find themselves in the
position of Terrell's family. This approach seems to be the one that the Ter-
rell court endorses, although the majority failed to fully explain itself in this
regard. With ten judges in agreement, 147 the Terrell decision is strong in its
endorsement of this more "hands-off' approach to section 1983 claims in
cases where there is no evidence of the state official's intent-to-harm. 48 The
court, however, should have explained its rationale in a more satisfying and
forthcoming manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the underlying claim in Terrell, substantive due proc-
ess claims challenge the constraints of our government's federalist system,
and the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Terrell family suffered an
incredible loss at the hands of irresponsible police conduct, and basic notions
of justice suggest that they should be compensated for their loss. According
to the Eighth Circuit, however, this compensation should not be awarded on
the basis of substantive due process constitutional law, but rather as a result
of state tort law. This assertion finds support in our judicial system's com-
mitment to federalism, but while the Eighth Circuit's decision in Terrell is
correct, the court should have encouraged state legislatures to adopt tort laws
designed to help provide compensation to victims in these situations.
BRAD K. THOENEN
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Id. at
125. Furthermore, the "doctrine of judicial self-restraint" also plays a role in these
section 1983 cases, and courts are required "to exercise the utmost care whenever
[they] are asked to break new ground in this field." Id.
146. See generally NAHMOD, supra note 23, at § 1.04.
147. Terrell, 396 F.3d at 976.
148. See generally id.
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